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1 Introduction
The economic and financial crisis had profound consequences not only for the econ-
omies of EU’s Member States, some of which are still far from complete recovery, but
also for the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union. A number of measures
has been taken at EU level to reinforce the coordination of economic governance in the
bloc and enhance regulation of the financial sector, aiming to better cope with similar
crisis scenarios in the future. Most of the policy response, following the agenda-setting
impulse by the European Council, was enacted through EU legislation, thereby requir-
ing approval from the European Parliament.
The aim of this paper is to analyse MEPs’ voting behaviour on a key number of final
legislative votes in the area of economic governance reform. Elected parliamentarians,
when deciding whether to vote for or against legislation, must balance the wishes of the
overall electorate, those of their specific constituencies within it, pressure from party
leaders and their own peculiar ideological leanings (Levitt 1996). While researchers
tend to agree that ideological inclination – under the form of party group affiliation – is
the primary determinant of vote choice for Members of the European Parliament, these
legislators are also agents with multiple principals, trying to balance out the pressure
coming from various sources. One of the potential determinants of vote choice is an
MEP’s nationality. Whereas several studies have confirmed the weakness of nationality
as such a factor influencing voting behaviour in the EP, we expect this established tenet
not to hold in the case of fiscal policy. As opposed to policy areas where EU
competences are solid and have long been established, fiscal integration is a sector
close to the fortress of national sovereignty and the hugely symbolic ‘power of the
purse’. EU integration in this area, in other words, potentially has much higher
consequences on a state’s capability to tax and spend, severely impairing its fiscal
autonomy. If consequences for their own Member State are so crucial, we expect
MEPs’ specific constituency (their nation state of origin) to play a much higher role
than usual on legislation related to fiscal discipline. This is particularly the case when
fiscal restrictions might have a differential impact on Member States due to their
varying pre-existing fiscal position and the intensity of the economic crisis which has
hit them. While our research does not overall challenge the primary finding that party
affiliation is the main determinant of vote choice in the EP (like in any other legisla-
ture), we aim to better disentangle the different components of vote choice. This
analysis is all the more crucial when legislative votes refer to measures having
differential impacts on the different countries MEPs come from.
As far as economic governance is concerned, all regulations and directives forming
the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack are analysed, together with the key vote required to
establish the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 1 Whereas scholarly work has
traditionally showed MEPs voting behaviour to be primarily driven by ideology (more
specifically, by the MEP’s party group affiliation), we expect to find MEPs’ national
origins to play a counterbalancing role and – at least partially – weaken intra-party
position on key fiscal integration matters, where a conflict of interest might exist
1 Financial regulation reform, arguably a similar policy area, is left aside due to the large consensus among
MEPs surrounding the regulatory measures taken in this field.
Cencig E., Sabani L.
between creditor and debtor member countries. We hypothesise the potential presence
of a tension between EP party affiliation and national identity with regard to economic
governance issues, because national sovereignty plays a crucial role in the fiscal space
domain. Sovereign states are driven by their own interests with regard to fiscal policy,
since their preferred policies are deeply linked to their specific economic conditions,
and European legislation constraining the possible choices in the fiscal realm has a
different impact on Member States’ economies, depending on their specific economic
cycle conditions. Our research hence aims to identify possible distinctive voting
patterns alongside EP political affiliation in this particular policy area. In order to do
so, we operationalise these Bsecondary^ factors under the form of economic variables
signalling a distress in the MEP’s country of origin economic conditions, and we also
investigate whether MEPs coming from crisis-ridden (PIIGS) countries display a
different voting behaviour than others, anticipating the much higher domestic implica-
tions of the EU-imposed fiscal policy reform.
The European Parliament has become a privileged object of analysis for political
scientists over the last decades, with waves of scholarly attention closely mirroring the
ever-increasing reinforcement of its powers since it was first directly elected in 1979. A
vast literature exists on legislative politics in the European Parliament, aimed at the
identification of the most significant dimensions shaping political and legislative
behaviour in the assembly of the EU. Research on voting behaviour in the EP has
become an established field over the years, with the mainstream literature agreeing that
party group affiliation is the main voting determinant for MEPs. In spite of methodo-
logical issues partially undermining these analyses, a consensus exists on an ever-
increasing level of intra-party cohesion in the EP and on the weakness of national
identities in explaining MEPs’ voting patterns. Nevertheless, our research builds on
some recent qualitative work pointing in the opposite direction and takes a look at
voting behaviour on a specific subset of legislative votes where national identity is
expected to create strong cleavages. Whereas our results do confirm traditional con-
clusions, we also find that national interests and country-level economic variables can
be strong predictors of MEPs’ votes. Our models show variables related to these
predictors to be statistically significant in a considerable number of cases, opening up
new avenues for future research on territorial cleavages in the European Parliament.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a brief summary of the existing
literature on voting behaviour in the European Parliament is presented. In Section 3
recalls the EU-level measures to tackle the crisis by enacting economic governance
reform. Section 4 provides information on the database, methodology and hypotheses.
Section 5 presents the results of our analysis and Section 6 contains some concluding
remarks.
2 Related Literature
Research on voting behaviour within the European Parliament builds upon previous
work on the US Congress, comprising seminal articles that tried to disentangle the
different determinants of voting dynamics among elected representatives of the US
population. For example, Levitt (1996) considers several possible factors, namely
personal preferences, the constituency’s interests, the state electorate preferences and
Voting Behaviour in the European Parliament and Economic Governance...
national party lines in his study of US senators, and finds out that personal ideological
preferences are the strongest determinant of legislators’ voting decision.
Since the birth of this institution, most MEPs have been sitting in party groups
reflecting traditional European party ideologies, and the minority of legislators sitting in
separate Bnational delegations^ has been shrinking over time, in line with the decrease
of independent groups in the EP (McElroy 2007, Hix and Høyland 2011).2 Therefore,
research has focused on the role of party groups in the European Parliament, and
several indexes of agreement have been developed to measure intra-party cohesion
(Attinà 1990). Intra-party cohesion, signalling consistency in voting behaviour among
MEPs from the same ideological area, has been steadily increasing over time. Recent
studies reinforce previous findings that EP party groups not only occupy the entire
range of the left-right spectrum, but also are clearly distinguishable from one another in
policy terms (McElroy and Benoit 2011). Furthermore, scholars showed that party
groups, rather than nationality, have played a huge role in coalition formation in the EP
from its very establishment (Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Kreppel 2000).
A major breakthrough came with the application of the NOMINATE scaling
algorithm to roll call vote data from the EP. NOMINATE analyses voting data to place
legislators in a multidimensional space, hence identifying the dimensions of conflict in
the EP. In view of its supranational character and institutional uniqueness in compar-
ative perspective, the scholarly community indeed had to find out whether traditional
domestic dynamics applied to the EP as well. While the classic theories of European
integration (intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism) both see EU politics as
centred on the speed of the integration process (more or less integration), these
empirical studies confirmed that political competition in this institution revolves around
the traditional left-right dimension (Hix 2001). Results clearly indicated that the main
dimension of conflict in the European Parliament is the classic left-right divide of
democratic politics (accounting for around 85% of the variation), with the anti/pro-EU
integration dimension playing only a minor role. National interests have very little
systematic influence on politics in the EP, a result somewhat surprising when thinking
of some Bstate interest^ - based theories of EU integration (Hix 2001; Hix et al. 2006).
To sum up, research on directly elected parliaments since 1979 has shown transna-
tional party affiliation to be much more important than national affiliation in determin-
ing voting decisions, with party cohesion in the EP steadily increasing over time (Hix
2001; Hix et al. 2006; Hix and Bartolini 2006; Hix and Noury 2009; Ringe 2010).
Voting behaviour and coalition formation happen mainly along a single policy dimen-
sion in the EP, and this dimension essentially corresponds to the domestic well-known
left-right divide (Kreppel 2000; Hix 2001; Hix 2002). However, this scholarly consen-
sus has come under attack on several fronts, with two major substantive and one
methodological critique.
Methodologically, this research been criticised because traditionally roll call votes
made up only 15-30% of all votes in the EP, and were likely called for a variety of
strategic reasons including the wish to enforce discipline and to signal a particular
2 Bressanelli (2012) investigates the factors behind political group membership in the European Parliament, by
fitting a multinomial logit model for political group ‘choice’ based on the 2009 Euromanifestos data. His
findings confirm that ideological compatibility is the most important factor behind transnational affiliation,
even if some caution is needed for the ‘new’, post-communist members.
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stance; roll call votes might therefore represent a biased sample of the population of
votes (Carrubba et al. 2004; Carrubba et al. 2006; Høyland 2010). Some of these
critiques have been addressed by demonstrating the absence of any strategic selection
bias between requested and mandated roll call votes, but the possible bias between roll
call votes and secret votes has not been explained so far (Hix et al. 2013). This problem
will truly disappear only in the future, as roll call votes have been compulsory on all
final legislative votes since 2009, and non-binding resolutions in plenary have been
subject to the same procedure since March 2014.
A second, substantive critique stems from the observation that MEPs are agents with
two principals. In fact, EP legislators are at once members of national parties and
affiliated to European party groups; they have multiple sources of affiliation leaving
room for a potentially high degree of political conflict. The two different Bprincipals^
both require their loyalty: national parties are responsible for the selection of candidates
for European elections and EP party groups control the allocation of committee
positions, finances, speaking time and other party positions in the European Parliament
(Hix et al. 2006). While the positions of one MEP’s national party and EP party group
normally coincide, there are instances where this is not the case and national delega-
tions cherish minority positions within the respective EP party groups. Hence, country-
based divisions become relevant in cases of conflict between the EP party group
position and the national party one. In these cases, research has shown MEPs to be
primarily loyal to their national party principals, who are in control of EU elections
candidatures (Hix 2002; Cicchi 2013). Nevertheless, national parties and national
interests must not be confused and one cannot maintain, basing on these results, that
national identities are a strong predictor of voting behaviour in the EP.
Another related critique to RCV research has been moved by scholars underlining
that pooling all data hides interesting variance across issue areas and across voting
procedures (Gische 2007; Rasmussen 2008; Cicchi 2013). One study on EU trade
policy, while confirming that MEPs vote prevalently in line with EP party groups,
found that on highly sensitive issues some national delegations vote along their national
interests and against the dominant position of their EP party groups (Kang 2013).
Another study dealt with foreign policy issues and analysed voting patterns in the EP
from 1979 to 2004, confirming the traditional result that EP party lines are the best
predictor of voting behaviour (Gische 2007). However, when breaking down votes into
more specific sub issues (such as justice or human rights), the author found the country
of origin to become a better predictor in some cases, a result which is easily concealed
by the pooled, large-n analyses which are standard in the literature. Some recent
publications have similarly shed new light on voting determinants in the EP by using
qualitative, interview-based methods. For example, a study conducted on a sample of
Danish MEPs showed national affiliation to play a much stronger role than previously
acknowledged in areas such as employment, environment and agricultural policy,
where MEPs seem to follow national interests rather than ideological positions
(Rasmussen 2008). The same goes for another recent survey of MEPs’ policy prefer-
ences, conducted in 2010, which found that the Member State of origin is a more
powerful predictor of general MEPs’ attitudes than the EP party group affiliation
(Farrell et al. 2012). The study found that a striking 40% of variance in policy positions
was explainable through MEPs’ nationalities, as opposed to only 15% attributable to
EP political group membership (and the remaining 45% accounted for by personal
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ideological preferences). These results are not entirely consistent with earlier research,
highlighting a puzzling gap between voting behaviour and general political attitudes. In
addition, they partially undermine the ‘EP party cohesion’ consensus and suggest that
more complex dynamics might be at stake especially on salient issues, a possibility
which we investigate further in this paper.
3 The EU’s Response to the Crisis: Economic Governance Reform
The main measures adopted by the EU to reinforce its economic governance structure after
the crisis and analysed in this paper are the creation of the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), the BSix-Pack^ and the BTwo-Pack^ (O Broin 2012, European Commission 2013).
This set of legislative votes does not of course represent the full population of codecision
reports in this policy area, nor the full population of legislative reports in the 7th European
Parliament (488), but it was chosen as a most likely case to test our hypotheses on the
relevance of national factors inMEPs’ voting choices. It is indeedwidely acknowledged that
these were indeed the most significant legislative acts in this policy area, as well as the most
controversial one. The nature of the case selection process hence might create a bias in our
results, which we fully recognise and discuss in the concluding section.
The European Stability Mechanism was established as a permanent firewall for
euro zone Member States experiencing financial difficulty, and provides financial
assistance programmes for a maximum lending capacity of €500 billion. A Member
State requiring financial assistance through the ESM is subject to conditionality via
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and must have ratified the European
Fiscal Compact. In November 2011, the Council and the European Parliament
adopted a legislative package comprising five Regulations and one Directive, the
Six-Pack,3 which reinforced the existing Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the
domain of fiscal policy. The Six-Pack applies to all EU Member States, but it
includes some specific rules for euro zone countries, especially regarding financial
sanctions. While the SGP focused on the surveillance of Member States’ budgetary
deficits, its recent reform complemented the coordination procedure with a similar
process for public debt levels, and put greater emphasis on prevention efforts to
ensure long-term sustainability of public finances. The new EU secondary law
package also created the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, thereby submitting
a wider spectrum of macroeconomic policies to EU level surveillance.
Another major innovation in the economic governance of the EU was the launch of
the European Semester, a cycle of fiscal and economic policy coordination taking place
3 Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the
effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of
the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Regulation
(EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention
and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011
amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive
deficit procedure, Directive of the Council on the requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member
States (Council Directive 2011/85/EU).
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during the first half of the year and embedded in the Europe 2020 strategy. Implement-
ed for the first time in 2011, its aim is to ensure a better harmonization among fiscal and
macroeconomic policies of the Member States, in the hope that synchronizing the
timetables of these procedures as well as increasing EU surveillance mechanisms
ensures enhanced convergence and stability in the European economies. Economic
policy coordination takes place in the three areas of fiscal policy, structural reforms and
macroeconomic imbalances, the latter having been acknowledged as a key factor
contributing to the recent economic crisis. The European Semester places little con-
straint on Member States’ individual choices, as EU-level guidance and country-
specific recommendations have no binding nature, thereby still giving little incentive
to comply apart from reputational and peer-pressure concerns.
In May 2013, a new package of legislation including two Regulations (the Two-
Pack) came into force, establishing stronger surveillance mechanisms for the budgetary
policies of euro area Member States.4 The Two-Pack introduced a common budgetary
deadline and common budgetary rules for euro area Member States, completing the
existing governance framework as this exercise of coordinated surveillance takes place
in autumn. In the meanwhile, a major reform introduced by the Two-Pack consists in
the European Commission’s power to assess their draft budgets before domestic
parliaments (by the end of November), and above all to request the concerned state
to submit a revised plan if it detects severe non-compliance with SGP obligations.
4 Data, Methodology and Hypotheses
In order to study the voting behaviour of MEPs on economic governance issues, we use
data downloaded from Votewatch.eu, the reference website to study legislators’ voting
behaviour in the European Parliament. The votes under analysis, discussed in the
previous section, are listed in Table 1.
Each observation in the downloaded datasets refer to a single MEP’s voting history
and records the following variables: name of the MEP, Member State of origin, voting
decision, EP party group and a binary variable signalling loyalty or rebellion to the
party group. As the outcome we aim to predict is the voting decision, we use a logit
model to estimate the MEP’s voting behaviour based on several variables, including EP
party affiliation and Member State of origin.5 The dependent variable is the voting
decision; we recoded the original variable BVote^ (taking the possible values BAbsent^,
BAbstain^, BAgainst^, BDidn’t Vote^, BDocumented Absence^ and BFor^) into a
dichotomous variable (Vote in Favour) taking value 1 when the vote is positive and 0
in all other possible cases. In a second set of analyses, we modelled an ordered probit
regression accounting for the different possible outcomes of this categorical variable,
namely BYes^, BNo^, BAbstain^ and BElse^ (to group all the cases where MEPs did not
4 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing
draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area.
5 We could have used a logit model as well, but we preferred probit, which is more frequently used in the
related literature, in order to make results comparable with previous findings.
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vote). We performed this second analysis led by a theoretical hypothesis that absten-
tions may conceal a deliberate strategic choice byMEPs, who could use this as a way to
rebel against their party groups and as a signal of dissatisfaction with the proposed
legislation, without going all the way and voting against it.
Table 2 shows the distribution of votes across Member States. Since the cornerstone
of our analysis is the role of nationality (and country-level variables) in leading MEPs’
voting choices, we started off from a descriptive visualisation of how the voting
outcome and Member State are associated (Pearson’s chi-square is 925.19, undoubtedly
demonstrating that the two variables are not uncorrelated).
The key independent variables are BEP in Favour^, BPIIGS^, BEurozone^ and those
related to the economic situation of the Member State of origin. BEP in Favour^ is a
recoding of BEP Group^, which reflects the MEP’s political affiliation inside the EP
and takes eight possible values, corresponding to the different party groups sitting in the
European Parliament (ALDE, ECR, EFD, EPP, GUE/NGL, Greens, S&D, Non-
Inscrits). As BEP Group^ is a categorical variable with a nominal scale, we recoded
it in order to signal the MEP’s belonging to the party coalition supporting the vote. For
each piece of legislation, we studied the distribution of BVote in Favour^ across parties
in order to detect the supporting coalition of EP groups (e.g. EEP, ALDE and S&D or
EPP, ALDE and Greens/NGL), i.e. the parties where at least 80% of the affiliated
Members voted in favour (see Tables 3 and 4). We then recoded the variable into a
dummy taking value 1 when the MEPs is part of this Bsupporting coalition^, which
does not hold a stable pattern over all votes, and value 0 when he/she is not. The second
independent variable is BPIIGS^, a dummy which takes value 1 when the MEP is from
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain or Cyprus and 0 in all other cases; it is therefore
aimed at identifying the countries particularly hit by the economic crisis and receiving
or having received some form of financial assistance by the EU (with the exception of
Italy). The variable BEurozone^ is a self-explanatory dummy accounting for the MEP
coming from a euro area Member State.
Alongside party group and nation of origin, we aimed to assess whether economic
conditions in the home country also played a part in legislators’ voting decision. In
order to do so, we included two additional variables in the models, namely BGDP
Change^ and BUnemployment Change^. BGDP Change^ measures the change in GDP
growth from the previous year to the year when the vote takes place; thus, higher
positive values signal an improvement in the country’s economic conditions.
BUnemployment Change^ similarly measures the change in the unemployment rate
from the previous year; higher values are hence a signal for the deterioration of the
economic conditions in the country of the MEP. In addition, we used data on Member
States’ fiscal position as directly linked to the Stability and Growth Pact indicators,
namely on the public debt and deficit levels, factors on which EU legislation on fiscal
coordination places explicit constraints on. Finally, we controlled for the credit rating of
the Member State in question.
In line with previous research findings, our first hypothesis is that EP party
affiliation, operationalised through the variable BEP in Favour^, is the main deter-
minant of MEPs’ voting decisions. If the EP party group cohesion is high and MEPs
predominantly vote in line with ideological determinants together with party col-
leagues, the coefficient of BEP in Favour^ should be highly significant and positive.
Our next hypothesis aims to add on this baseline scenario, unchallenged in the
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Table 2 Distribution of votes by Member State
Yes No Abstain Else
Austria 89 48 8 12
56.69% 30.57% 5.10% 7.64%
Belgium 121 48 12 17
61.11% 24.24% 6.06% 8.59%
Bulgaria 99 23 10 23
63.87% 14.84% 6.45% 14.84%
Cyprus 25 18 5 6
46.3% 33.33% 9.26% 11.11%
Czech Republic 51 79 51 17
25.76% 39.9% 25.76% 8.59%
Denmark 61 37 9 10
52.14% 31.62% 7.69% 8.55%
Estonia 51 0 0 3
94.44% 0.00% 0.00% 5.56%
Finland 89 17 4 7
76.07% 14.53% 3.42% 5.98%
France 409 149 21 73
62.73% 22.85% 3.22% 11.20%
Germany 605 178 35 73
67.9% 19.98% 3.93% 8.19%
Greece 103 51 20 24
52.02% 25.76% 10.10% 12.12%
Hungary 146 32 5 15
73.74% 16.16% 2.53% 7.58%
Ireland 64 20 5 17
60.38% 18.87% 4.72% 16.04%
Italy 404 107 88 51
62.15% 16.46% 13.54% 7.85%
Latvia 52 13 1 8
70.27% 17.57% 1.35% 10.81%
Lithuania 72 12 10 14
66.67% 11.11% 9.26% 12.96%
Luxembourg 43 7 3 1
79.63% 12.96% 5.56% 1.85%
Malta 19 6 2 20
40.43% 12.77% 4.26% 42.55%
Netherlands 158 47 10 37
62.70% 18.65% 3.97% 14.68%
Poland 264 29 36 95
62.26% 6.84% 8.49% 22.41%
Portugal 125 49 25 10
59.81% 23.44% 11.96% 4.78%
Cencig E., Sabani L.
literature, to bring national factors into MEPs’ voting decision. In particular, two
competing narratives result in two alternative hypotheses: hypothesis 2 is that
β^EZ > 0, i.e. coming from the euro zone significantly enhances MEPs’ likelihood
of voting in favour of the proposed measure. This is likely to be the case if euro
zone MEPs, whose countries of origin are to be more directly affected by the
proposed reforms, wish to improve the resilience of the economic governance
architecture of the euro area. In other terms, there might be an enhanced sense of
‘responsibility’ moving these MEPs to support a stronger coordination of economic
policies significantly more than non-euro zone MEPs. Legislators from the euro
zone might be more prone to blame the deficiencies in the EMU architecture –
especially the lack of a common fiscal policy aligned with the common monetary
policy – for their countries' crisis and hence more willing to reinforce the common
rules of fiscal surveillance. The confirmation of this hypothesis would signal an
ever-growing differentiation between the Bcore^ and non-euro area countries, which
goes in the direction of a Btwo-speed^ European Union: this result could be partially
expected because some pieces of legislation are applicable only in the euro zone,
but it would nonetheless imply that MEPs tend to consider, while voting, the
consequences for their country of origin.
The alternative scenario, underlining hypothesis 3, is that MEPs from BPIIGS^
countries are less likely to support the proposed economic governance reforms; in this
case β^PIIGS < 0. This would happen if MEPs from crisis-ridden Member States,
already facing tough economic conditions and financial difficulty, become wary of
further strengthening fiscal rules and hence reject an economic reform inspired by the
Bfiscal rectitude^ dogma. This scenario is coherent with political economy accounts of
the crisis which underline the deepening divide between creditor and debtor Member
States: we aim to assess here whether this dynamic plays out in the European
Parliament as well and not only in the Council of the EU, where national interests
are directly advocated and this division has been routinely reported.
Table 2 (continued)
Yes No Abstain Else
Romania 192 48 5 32
69.31% 17.33% 1.81% 11.55%
Slovakia 84 18 7 2
75.68% 16.22% 6.31% 1.80%
Slovenia 71 9 20 7
66.36% 8.41% 18.69% 6.54%
Spain 311 68 7 40
73.00% 15.96% 0.64% 9.39%
Sweden 118 38 41 23
53.64% 17.27% 18.64% 10.45%
United Kingdom 160 225 102 91
27.68% 38.93% 17.65% 15.74%
Source: VoteWatch.eu
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As far as the economic context is concerned, a situation of recession is expected to
diminish MEPs’ willingness to vote in favour of the proposed economic governance
reforms, mainly because of the possibly higher Badjustment^ and implementation costs
of the new legislation for crisis-ridden countries. This hypothesis recalls theories of
economic voting, which focus on voters’ decision as driven by economic consider-
ations, including an attribution of responsibility to the current government (the
Bsanctioning^ model) or a selection of the most competent candidate (the Bselection^
model) (Bartkowska and Tiemann 2015; Okolikj and Quinlan 2016). The key differ-
ence is that economic conditions here play a role not in citizens’ vote of the next
government, but in legislators’ vote of proposed legislation. However, there are some
similarities between the selection model of economic voting and our hypothesis on
MEPs’ voting behavior. In other terms, forward-looking MEPs faced with worsening
economic conditions in their country of origin would be less likely to support reform
that goes towards strengthening fiscal policy requirements.
5 Results
Our analysis of the European Parliament’s final votes on key crisis-related economic
governance highlights some remarkable patterns. A first interesting finding we obtained
by a preliminary observation of VoteWatch data is that the coalition of party groups in
favour of the concerned directive/regulation was not the same on all votes (Table 2).
Strengthening economic governance at the EU level did not attract the consensus of all
MEPs: only ALDE and the European People’s Party consistently supported the reform of
the existing fiscal coordination framework. This pattern might be explained by the fact
that ALDE is a centrist party group, while the European People’s Party has traditonally
been pro-integrationist and brings together political parties with quite conservative fiscal
policy stances. This is far from surprising, since the proposed reform of the Stability and
Growth Pact was criticized by most left-leaning forces: budgetary rules were deemed to
be too tight and they have not been complemented by the creation of a common fiscal
resource, e.g. via the issuance of Eurobonds, as advocated by some. For this reason, the
S&D group did not support any of the regulations and directives in the economic
governance packages (Six-Pack and Two-Pack), with one notable exception, namely
the creation of theMacroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. On the other hand, the Greens/
EFA party group showed a high degree of support for the proposed packages, possibly
due to their very positive attitude towards stronger EU integration. This varying pattern of
support for the proposed economic governance measures does not reflect only the
different degree of consensus regarding the single initiatives, it also mirrors the growing
politicization of the European Parliament (Kreppel 2000; Hix and Bartolini 2006).
Logistic regressions were run on the two pooled clusters of economic governance
votes to test our hypotheses. First, we find confirmation of the traditional results in the
scholarly literature on voting behaviour in the European Parliament, i.e. that the
primary factor influencing a legislator’s decision to vote in favour or against a proposed
measure is his/her EP party affiliation. This is demonstrated by the high and positive
coefficient of the variable BEP in Favour^, which is highly significant across all
estimated models (Table 5). Moreover, Hypothesis 2 is also confirmed: MEPs from
the euro zone are significantly more likely to support economic governance reform,
Cencig E., Sabani L.
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even controlling for EP party affiliation. The coefficient, although not particularly high,
is significant at the 95% confidence level. On the other hand and contrary to our
expectations, coming from a crisis-ridden country (PIIGS) seems to affect MEPs’
voting behaviour in the opposite direction than expected: while the coefficient is not
of a high magnitude, it is positive and statistically significant, thus implying MEPs
from crisis-ridden countries are also more likely to vote in favour. This result, although
surprising, might be explained by the fact that PIIGS countries are actually all Eurozone
Member States and the two groupings are hence overlapping. Hypothesis 3 is not
confirmed: MEPs from crisis-ridden countries are not less likely than MEPs from other
Member States to vote in favour of economic governance reform.
Turning to the role played by the economic context of MEPs’ Member States of
origin, our results find support for the effect of both GDP and unemployment rates on
their voting decisions on economic governance reform. The coefficients on both
BGDP Change^ and BUnemployment Change^ (included in alternative model speci-
fications due to multicollinearity issues) are both significant and in the expected
direction. MEPs facing a worsening of the economic conditions in their countries
are less likely to vote in favour of the proposed reform, centred on a tightening of
common fiscal rules. Thus, they are forward-looking and anticipate future adjustment
costs for their home economies. This result is particularly interesting since the role of
economic factors in MEPs’ vote choices has not been explored in the literature so far,
yet our findings suggest this is an interesting path to explore. Similarly, the coefficient
on the public debt position of the country of origin is also significant and positive
(higher debt/GDP levels make MEPs less likely to vote in favour), while the
coefficient on deficit positions is not. Another interesting result is the fact that the
percentage of positive votes was generally higher in 2013 than in 2011, as signalled
by the significant and positive coefficient on the year dummy. Similarly, the legisla-
tive procedure seems to matter somewhat, with MEPs more likely to cast a positive
vote when under the ordinary legislative procedure than in the case of other proce-
dures (in this case, consultation). Lastly, the credit rating of the country of origin does
not make any difference on MEPs’ voting behaviour.
The figures below show the marginal effect on unemployment growth in the
MEPs’ countries of origin: as the unemployment rate rises, MEPs are significantly
less likely to vote in favour of the proposed legislation. The same happens for the
GDP variable: as GPD rises and the economic conditions get better, MEPs are
more likely to vote in favour of legislation on fiscal integration (Figs. 1 and 2).
In models (7) and (8), we added interaction terms to investigate whether these
macro-economic variables have a differential impact on euro zone or PIIGS MEPs;
we focused on unemployment levels since we found it to be a stronger predictor. Here,
results indeed show that the effect of unemployment change is highly significant for
non-eurozone and non-PIIGS countries, as we can see in Figs. 3 and 4. More specif-
ically, for Eurozone MEPs a worsening of the unemployment conditions only has a
very small effect on their probability to vote in favour, whereas the effect of this
variable is massive for MEPs coming from non-eurozone countries. A similar pattern is
detected regarding PIIGS versus non-PIIGS countries, as the effect of a change in
unemployment levels is only significant for MEPs not coming from crisis-affected
Member States. These results certainly deserve some additional theoretical investiga-
tion in further research.
Cencig E., Sabani L.
In a second part of the analysis, we estimated ordered probit models in order to
account for a finer grained vote choice, namely taking into account not only the
decision to vote in favour but also that of casting a negative vote and to abstain. As
shown in Table 6, the model fits decrease quite remarkably, while the size and
significance of the coefficients is overall very similar (although in the opposite direction
as the highest category of the dependent variable used here is the decision to abstain
from the vote). There are however a few differences, like the fact that here GDP change
is a much stronger predictor, as is the origin from a PIIGS country; hence, MEPs from
crisis-ridden Member States are more likely to abstain from the vote, and also more
likely to vote against than vote in favour of proposed legislation.
As a final check, we estimated all the models separately for each of the voting
resolutions and each of the countries. While estimating vote choice on some of the
crisis-ridden countries separately did lower the number of observations (particularly for
small Member States such as Cyprus), thus leading in higher standard errors and fewer
significant coefficients, overall our results are robust to these alternative specifications.
6 Conclusions
This article aimed to assessMEPs’ voting behaviour in the arena of crisis-driven economic
governance reform at EU level. Our expectation was that a range of factors was relevant
alongside political party affiliation in shaping MEPs’ voting decisions on these sensitive
Figs. 3 and 4 Marginal effect of Unemployment according to MS of origin
Figs. 1 and 2 Marginal effects of unemployment growth and GDP growth
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issues, particularly in a context which experienced a resurgence of nationalist feelings on
some crisis-management choices. More specifically, we expected MEPs’ national origins
and home countries’ economic conditions to create possible cleavages and determine
distinctive voting patterns, especially on some delicate matters.
In accordance with the established literature on voting behaviour in the European
Parliament, the quantitative analysis showed the most powerful predictor of one MEP’s
decision to vote in favour to be her EP party group. Nevertheless, a second noteworthy
finding is the peculiar role played by the economic situation under the form of GDP and
unemployment indicators in the MEP’s country of origin. A deterioration in the
national employment situation or GDP growth rate had a negative effect on the
legislators’ probability to support the new EU economic governance structure: when
the unemployment level increased or the GDP growth rate decreased, MEPs were less
likely to cast a positive vote on the proposed reform of economic governance.
However, these macroeconomic indicators have a differential impact on MEPs from
different sets of countries, and worsening economic conditions seem to have mattered
the most for MEPs not coming from either the euro zone or PIIGS countries. Whereas
these partially unexplained findings deserve some further theoretical investigation,
including these variables in the analysis shows that national factors are indeed relevant
in determining MEPs’ behaviour, even when controlling for EP party affiliation.
In spite of the limited nature of the study and the peculiar nature of votes chosen, our
findings add some interesting insights to the research on voting behaviour inside the
European Parliament. Intra-party voting cohesion has been on the rise for several decades
and party affiliation is shown to have played a fundamental role in our sample of votes, in
line with existing literature. While the generalizability of this study might be limited – we
chose a sample of highly salient and consequential votes – there are some lessons to be
learnt on the role of national factors in predicting MEPs’ behavior, at least on particularly
controversial and non-routine issues. Our findings for the economic context shed some
new light on previous research, and suggest a possible enlargement of the analysis to a
more comprehensive group of votes, both in the economic and financial realm as in other
policy areas. These findings could also be related to the results in a similar area of study on
the European Parliament, which looks at how legislative reports are allocated among
committee members. Investigating factors affecting rapporteurship allocation, several
scholars have found that national factors play a role in these choices too (Kaeding 2004;
Hurka and Kaeding 2012). Context might be more crucial than usually believed in this
strand of the literature, and we should explore this avenue further.
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